A Russian Tu-160 bomber during a military parade in Minsk for Belarus Independence Day, July 3, 2019/ TASS. Tu-160: a history — As tensions ...
A Russian Tu-160 bomber during a military parade in Minsk for Belarus Independence Day, July 3, 2019/ TASS. |
Russia's Tu-160 Bomber / Beltytukov. |
Moreover, those massive wings could swing between three positions: fully extended at 20 degrees to maximize lift, then swept back to 35 degrees to reduce drag for subsonic cruising, and tucked fully back to 65 degrees when sprinting at the maximum speed of Mach 2.05 using afterburners.
The airframe's aerodynamically unstable characteristics were automatically compensated for by a quadruple-redundant fly-by-wire system. The Tu-160 could carry enough fuel to fly 7,500 miles with a 50% missile payload, and its retractable refueling probe enabled even greater ranges if desired. A crew of four operates the bomber on its long-distance missions — pilot and co-pilot seated side by side in the front, and two navigators individually sub-specialized in weapons and self-defense systems.
Entering service the same year as the US supersonic B-1B Lancer bomber, which it resembled in some respects, the Tu-160 was much larger and had a 70% faster maximum speed. However, the Lancer had a slighter radar signature and would evolve to employ a wider range of weapons, though it was stripped of nuclear weapons capability in the 2010s.
A Russian Tu-160 bomber, known as the White Swan, lands at Engels Air Base near Saratov. Misha Japaridze/AP. |
Inside the cockpit of Tu-160 bomber / RIA Novosti. |
There were also unrealized plans to create a Tu-161 long-range interceptor for hunting NATO maritime patrol planes, a Tu-160PP electronic warfare jet, a Tu-160R reconnaissance plane, and even Blackjacks modified to carry supersonic drones or Burlak air-launched satellite deployment vehicles.
From the Soviet Union to Russia
Just two Tu-160s squadrons were operational when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 — and of the 36 Tu-160s built (including several prototypes), 19 were in the 184th Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment based at Pryluky Airbase in Ukraine, and thus grandfathered into the new Ukrainian Air Force. Four more airframes remained unassembled. The heavy bombers proved too expensive for cash-strapped Ukraine to regularly fly or even maintain.
After NATO-Russia tensions flared in 1999 due to the Kosovo war, the Kremlin sought to buy Tu-160s and their missiles back from Ukraine to flesh out its own impractically small fleet. But Moscow was also short on money and couldn't meet Kiev's $3 billion asking price.
In the end, Russia acquired eight of the huge bombers and 575 cruise missiles from Ukraine in exchange for cancellation of $285 million in natural gas debt owed to Moscow. Ukraine scrapped the rest, save for one on display at the Poltava Museum of Heavy Bomber Aviation.
White Swan, nuclear troll, Syrian scattershot
Moscow subsequently strove to rebuild its dilapidated Tu-160 force by refurbishing aircraft and building unassembled airframes, funding permitting — though one Tu-160 and its crew were lost in a 2003 crash. By 2021 Russia officially had 16 or 17 operational Tu-160s, though no more than 11 have been seen deployed at one time, grouped into the 121st Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment based at Engels airbase in Saratov, Russia. Most are named after famous Russian historical or fictional personages.
When Putin announced the resumption of strategic bomber patrols in 2006, the small Blackjack force and more numerous Tu-95 Bear bombers were at the forefront of Moscow's campaign to remind everybody it could still dispatch nuclear-armed bombers to buzz by a country's airspace.
Blackjacks could tweak Washington for example with layovers in Venezuela and Nicaragua (on one occasion violating Colombian airspace) or be deployed near Alaska. Some of these patrols, aided by in-flight refueling, set new records for endurance, with Tu-160s staying airborne 23 hours in 2010, and then 25 hours in 2020 while traversing over 12,400 miles.
Blackjacks were finally combat-tested in 2015, launching dozens of new Kh-101 conventional stealth cruise missiles to strikes anti-Assad insurgents in Syria in November 2015 and again in 2016. The 2015 missile attacks tended to fall wildly off-target, though it's unknown how many misses came from Kh-101s rather than Kh-555 missiles launched by Tu-95s. In theory, however, the Kh-101 conventional and Kh-102 nuclear missiles constitute a major upgrade, extending range to 4,000 kilometers (2,485 miles), and boasting greater stealth, re-targetability after launch and improved precision.
The second act for the White Swan
Unlike the US Air Force, which seems skeptical its B-1B bombers bring enough added value over B-52s, the Kremlin is doubling down on the Tu-160. First of all, Russia is modernizing Tu-160s to the Tu-160M2 model, installing more fuel-efficient NK-32-02 engines expected to increase range by over 600 miles, GLONASS satellite-navigation systems, a digitized glass cockpit, and new AESA radar.
It also includes the application of radar-absorbent materials to the canopy which may modestly reduce the bomber's radar signature, new defensive countermeasures. Finally, there's the integration of the Kh-101/102 missiles and possibly air-launched Kinzhal hypersonic weapon, giving the Tu-160 more effective and survivable weaponry. Russia's Defense Ministry has also ordered production of 10 new Tu-160Ms at the Kazan factory out of an eventual planned 50 more of the Soviet-era jet bombers for 900 billion rubles, with production ostensibly to peak at three per year.
This is in part due to delays developing the PAK-DA stealth bomber. However, given the high cost of new Tu-160 production (ostensibly 16 billion rubles or $218 million per aircraft) and the arthritic state of Russian defense financing, observers are skeptical Moscow can sustain such an expensive and ambitious program, especially once the supply of unassembled or un-refurbished Tu-160 airframes is exhausted.
After all, that funds could go to the PAK-DA or more expendable stealth combat drones. However, the money and effort already devoted to the Tu-160 suggest Russia's Blackjack fleet is likely to continue ticking upward in the 2020s. Still, Moscow seemingly values the conspicuous global power projection the large bomber flights provide. Moreover, attempts to renew procurement seemingly reflect faith that the White Swan and its modernized standoff-range cruise missiles have acceptable odds of penetrating US air defenses, even if some Russian critics harbor doubts.
Sébastien Roblin writes on the technical, historical, and political aspects of international security and conflict for publications including the 19FortyFive, The National Interest, NBC News, Forbes.com , Science Techniz, and War is Boring. He holds a master's degree from Georgetown University and served with the Peace Corps in China.